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GRAND JURY SECRECY 
Richard M. Calkins* 
R ECENT opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States have expressed an increasing concern with outmoded criminal 
practices of our courts, both state and federal.1 Perhaps motivated 
by these decisions, a discernible trend toward a more realistic and 
liberalized procedure of criminal discovery is emerging in many 
jurisdictions. The past decade, for example, has seen a thorough re-
appraisal of the use of grand jury minutes and concomitant efforts 
of courts to place within proper perspective what was previously 
considered an inviolable doctrine of grand jury secrecy. But, with 
every such trend toward judicial "reform," there appear countering 
forces that seek to maintain the status quo or to force a retreat to 
legal concepts long antiquated and rejected. Such a force, opposing 
the more liberalized use of grand jury minutes by defendants, has 
been the "reform" legislation recently enacted by the Illinois 
Legislature.2 
While an increasing number of jurisdictions have recognized the 
need for permitting a defendant greater access to grand jury minutes, 
the Illinois Legislature, by its newly enacted Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure, has virtually eliminated all opportunity for a defendant to 
gain access to such minutes. In so doing, the legislature has pur-
ported to withdraw control of grand jury proceedings from the 
courts and to place it in the state's attorney's office, an unprecedented 
innovation. In substance, the new provision provides that only 
"when the State uses, for the purposes of examining any witness, 
any part of a transcript of matters occurring before the Grand Jury" 
may that portion "be disclosed when the court . . . in the interests 
of justice so directs."3 
• Member of the Illinois Bar.-Ed. 
I. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, !17!1 U.S. 8!1 (196!1) (pertaining to defendant's right to 
favorable evidence that is in the possession of the prosecution); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. !1!15 (196!1) (pertaining to defendant's right to counsel); Jencks v. United 
States, !15!1 U.S. 657 (1957) (pertaining to defendant's right to statements of govern-
ment witnesses). See also Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, !l!l F.R.D. 47, 56 (196!1). 
2. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. !18, § 112-6 (196!1). 
!l. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. !18, § 112-6(b) (196!1) provides in full: 
"(b) Matters other than the deliberations and vote of any grand juror may 
be disclosed by the State's Attorney solely in the performance of his duties. 
When the State uses, for the purpose of examining any witness, any part of a 
transcript of matters occurring before the Grand Jury, that portion of the trans-
cript may be disclosed when the court, preliminary to or in connection with 
[455] 
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When a leading state such as Illinois enacts "reform" legislation, 
an impact on the legislatures of other jurisdictions may be antici-
pated. Accordingly, a need exists for an examination of this legisla-
tion in the light of the common-law background of grand jury 
secrecy and for a further analysis of it in the face of the growing 
trend toward more liberalized discovery of grand jury minutes in 
other jurisdictions. It is the contention of the author that such an 
empirical study will demonstrate that this legislation adopted by 
Illinois is contrary to all modern judicial thinking and is, in fact, a 
retrogressive step toward a period long outdated; that it facilitates 
serious abuses inherent in granting to the prosecution sole control 
over the use of grand jury minutes; and that, by the very limitations 
it creates, a serious question is raised as to its constitutionality. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF GRAND JURY SECRECY 
A cursory analysis of the historical background of grand jury 
secrecy reveals two important considerations: recognition of grand 
jury secrecy was motivated by a grave need for protecting the grand 
jury from the abuses of the Crown; and, the common-law doctrine 
of grand jury secrecy w_as never envisioned as an instrument to be 
invoked or waived as the prosecution saw fit. 
At its inception in England in 1166, the grand jury was not 
protected by principles of secrecy; its deliberations were open to 
the public, and it functioned solely in the interest of the Crown.4 
This was an age when little regard was given to the rights of private 
citizens. The Grand Assize, as the grand jury was called, was in-
a judicial proceeding, directs such in the interests of justice. The court may 
direct that a Bill of Indictment shall be kept secret until the defendant is in 
custody or has given bail and in either event the clerk shall seal the Bill of 
Indictment and no person shall disclose the finding of the Bill of Indictment 
except when necessary for the issuance and execution of a warrant. Any grand 
juror or officer of the court who shall disclose, other than to his attorney, -matters 
occurring before the Grand Jury other than in accordance with the provisions of 
this subsection shall be in contempt of court, subject to proceedings in ac-
cordance to law." 
4. Some commentators contend that the Assize of Clarendon issued by Henry II 
in 1166 was not the precursor of the grand jury, but the petit jury. One commen-
tator asserts that it was not until 1368, toward the end of the reign of Henry III, 
that the modem practice of returning a panel of twenty-four men called "the graunde 
inquest" to inquire for the county was established. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY 26 
(1906). Other authorities note that similar accusing bodies may have been utilized 
by the Athenians before the Christian era, by the Saxons who settled in England 
in ,the fifth and seventh centuries, and by the Scandinavians in the eighth century. 
For a discussion of this historical background, see 1 HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAw 312-27 (3d ed. 1922); STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAw OF 
ENGLAND 184-86, 250-58 (1883). 
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voked to augment the power of the Crown by acting as a public 
prosecutor for the purpose of ferreting out certain crimes. In 1368, 
after a long period of diminishing importance of the Grand Assize 
as an accusatory body, there emerged a wholly distinct body called 
"le graunde inquest," which subsequently lodged all criminal 
charges whether or not private accusers came forward. Significantly, 
this body adopted the custom of hearing witnesses in private, thereby 
establishing some independence of action from the Crown. 5 
However, the true independence of the grand jury and the insti-
tution of grand jury secrecy as a legal concept received their first 
real impetus in 1681 as a result of the Earl of Shaftesbury Trial.6 In 
that case, the King's counsel had insisted that the grand jury hear 
in open court testimonial evidence of certain treason charges that 
had been lodged by the Crown against the Earl of Shaftesbury. 
Following the hearing, the jurors demanded and were granted the 
right to interview the witnesses in private chambers. Although the 
Crown had expected full acquiescence, the indictment ultimately 
was returned by the jury with the word "ignoramus" written across 
it. The jurors gave only their consciences as the reason for declin-
ing to indict. The case was thereafter celebrated as a bulwark against 
the oppression and despotism of the Crown.7 
This procedure of receiving testimony in private, outside the 
presence of the prosecution and defendant alike, was a common 
practice for a considerable period of time.8 As fear of coercion from 
5. See EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 4, at 27. See also Kuh, The Grand Jury 
"Presentment": Foul Blow or Fair Play'! 55 CoLuM. L. REv. 1103 (1955). 
6. 8 How. St. Tr. 759, 771-74 (1681). For a discussion of this case, see EDWARDS, 
op. cit. supra note 4, at 29, and 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360 (3d ed. 1940). 
7. A second case, Trial of Stephen College at Oxford for High Treason, 8 How. St. 
Tr. 549, 550 (1681) is also cited for the meritorious action of the grand jury in with-
standing the strongest possible pressure from the Crown. The presiding judge com-
pelled the grand jury to hear witnesses in court. The grand jury then demanded 
that they be permitted to examine the witnesses in private, which the court allowed. 
After considering the matter for several hours, they ignored the bill, refused to re-
turn an indictment, and informed the court that they had given their verdict ac-
cording to their consciences and would stand by it. Edwards states: 
"It was in this period that the independence of the grand jury became 
established. No longer required to make known to the court the evidence upon 
which they acted, meeting in secret and sworn to keep their proceedings secret 
by oath which contained no reservation in favor of the government, selected 
from the gentlemen of the best figure in the country, and without regard to 
their knowledge of any particular offence, the three centuries that followed the 
return of twenty four knights (1368], witnessed its freedom of action from all 
restraint by the court. The independence which the institution had attained 
was soon to be put to the severest tests, but protected by the cloak of secrecy 
and free from the control of the court as to their findings, they successfully 
thwarted the unjust designs of the government." EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 4, 
at 28. 
8. E.g., People v. Klaw, 53 Misc. 158, 104 N.Y. Supp. 482 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. 1907). If a 
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governmental influences subsided, however, a prosecutor for the 
Crown or state was permitted to be present during the taking of 
testimony in order that he might draw the form of the indictment 
desired by the jury. Gradually, in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, there evolved greater freedom in the use of 
grand jury proceedings by the state, and, today, it is a commonly 
accepted right of the state. 
In examining the evolution of grand jury secrecy, it is important 
to note that the common-law concept of secrecy that was imparted 
to American jurisprudence arose initially from a need to protect 
the grand jurors and private citizens from the oppression of the 
state. It was not intended to aid the prosecution in its discovery of 
facts or to protect the prosecution's case from disclosure. 
At the present time, the reasons for the policy of grand jury 
secrecy are, for the most part, very different from those for which 
it was originally conceived. Therefore it is essential to ascertain and 
analyze these reasons in order to determine whether a need for 
secrecy continues. If valid reasons for a policy no longer exist, cer-
tainly any requirement to pursue that policy should terminate. 
Grand jury secrecy should be maintained to the full extent necessary 
to fulfill the ends of justice, and no further.I' 
Courts normally advance four reasons in justification of grand 
jury secrecy: 
I. The grand jurors should be free from the apprehension that 
their opinions and votes may subsequently be disclosed by 
compulsion; 
2. The complainants and witnesses summoned should be free 
from the apprehension that their testimony may be subse-
quently disclosed by compulsion so that the state may secure 
willing witnesses; 
3. The guilty accused should not be provided with information 
that might enable him to flee from arrest, suborn false 
testimony, or tamper with witnesses or grand jurors; 
4. The innocent accused, who is charged by complaint before 
the grand jury but exonerate~ by its refusal to indict, 
grand juror disclosed to any person indicted for a felony the evidence that was given 
before the grand jury, he was thereby made an accessory to the crime; and, in the 
days of Blackstone, such juror was guilty of high misprision and liable to fine and 
imprisonment. See Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (6th Cir. 1940); Goodman 
v. United States, 108 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1939). Even today, in Texas and Missouri, 
violation of grand jury secrecy is a misdemeanor. Mo. REv. STAT. § 3924 (1959). 
Addison v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 181, 211 S.W. 225 (1919); Misso v. State, 61 Tex. 
Crim. 241, 135 S.W. 1173 (1911). 
9. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2360 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
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should be protected from the compulsory disclosure of the 
fact that he has been groundlessly accused. 
Of paramount importance is the maintenance of secrecy con-
cerning the deliberations and votes of the grand jurors themselves, 
both during and subsequent to a hearing.10 The citizen who assumes 
this high and responsible duty must be assured that the law will not 
permit him to be subjected to the malice and consequent injury 
that might result from an accused neighbor's knowledge that he 
advocated and voted for the latter's indictment. Few, if any, courts 
have broken the seal of secrecy in this regard, and its permanence 
exists even after the indictment has been returned, the accused 
apprehended, and the grand jury discharged.11 
The second reason for secrecy, to facilitate free and open dis-
closure by witnesses and complainants, is of particular importance 
to the state during the preparation of its case. Inasmuch as the state 
desires to insure that sufficient evidence is forthcoming from those 
appearing before the grand jury, witnesses and complainants are 
protected, at least temporarily, against compulsory disclosure of 
their testimony. Secrecy is the state's inducement for obtaining 
evidence.12 
The third reason is also of importance to the state because an 
accused should not know of the charges until the state can appre-
hend him and place him in custody. Premature disclosure might 
facilitate his escape. Furthermore, courts have recognized that the 
grand jury's function of making a preliminary and ex parte investi-
gation to ascertain probable cause could easily be impeded by an 
accused who, knowing of the proceedings and fearing indictment, 
IO. See United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343, 347 (N.D.N.Y. 1881); People v. 
Goldberg, 302 Ill. 559, 135 N.E. 84 (1922); Turk v. Martin, 232 Ky. 479, 23 S.W.2d 
937 (1930); State v. Borg, 8 N.J. Misc. 349, 150 Atl. 189 (1930); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 
2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
233-34 (1940). 
11. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956). Its establishment in the 
Constitution "as the sole method for preferring charges in serious criminal cases" 
indeed "shows the high place it [holds] as an instrument of justice." Id. at 362. See 
also Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959). A number 
of jurisdictions have provided by statute that the votes and deliberations of the 
grand jury may not be disclosed. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e); Aluz. R. CRIM. P. 
106(b); FLA. SrAT. § 905.25 (1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-924 (1949); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 277, § 13 (1959); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-1415 (1956); OHIO REv. CODE 
ANN. § 2939.19 (Page 1954); WASH. REv. CoDE § 10.28.100 (Supp. 1956); Wrs. STAT. 
ANN. § 255.20 (1957); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-111 (1957). 
12. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959). See also 
8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 2362. 
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obtained witnesses through collusive means to testify falsely on his 
behalf.13 
The fourth reason is of particular importance to the innocent 
accused, who, having been exonerated by the grand jury, must be 
protected from any possible condemnation or suspicion on the part 
of friends or the public generally. Such protection can be maintained 
only by permanent secrecy of the grand jury proceedings brought 
against him. 
Once the accused has been indicted, apprehended, and the grand 
jury discharged, however, a question arises as to the need for con-
tinued secrecy. As noted above, courts do not challenge the need 
for permanent secrecy of the grand jury's votes, deliberations, and 
the fact that an innocent accused has been exonerated. But whether 
the policy reasons for secrecy continue to exist with respect to a 
witness' or complainant's testimony before the grand jury if subse-
quent proceedings are brought raises a highly perplexing problem. 
Thus, this area of secrecy must be further explored. 
II. PERMANENT SECRECY OF GRAND JURY TESTIMONY 
Unquestionably, one of the most controversial issues discussed 
by judges and lawyers alike is the need for continued secrecy of a 
witness' testimony once the grand jury has been discharged and the 
accused apprehended. Generally urged as a reason for continued 
secrecy is the effect disclosure might have on future witnesses before 
the grand jury who might hesitate to testify freely if they knew 
that the evidence they give might soon thereafter be in the hands 
of the accused.14 The possibility of reprisal, it is contended, is also 
a realistic reason for continued secrecy unless the clear demands of 
justice require disclosure.15 Furthermore, the possibility that an 
accused who has knowledge of the evidence against him might tam-
per with the prosecution's witnesses or suborn false testimony for 
use at the trial is suggested as an additional reason for continued 
secrecy. 
13. See Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 97 (4th Cir. 1908). 
14. See Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959). 
15. The Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 
395, 400 (1959) states: 
"Moreover, not only would the participation of the jurors be curtailed, but 
testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew that his testimony would 
soon be in the hands of the accused. Especially is this true in antitrust proceed-
ings where fear of business reprisal might haunt both the grand juror and the 
witness." 
See also Minton v. State, supra note 14; United States v. General Motors Corp., 15 F.R.D. 
486, 488 (D. Del. 1954). 
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Any analysis of these reasons, however, demonstrates that they 
are more theoretical than practical. First, the rule of secrecy con-
cerning matters transpiring in the grand jury room is designed pri-
marily as an aid and protection to the grand jury, not the witnesses 
appearing before it.16 A witness is not a confidential informant;17 
he must consider his testimony subject to all the obligations of 
oath required in any judicial proceeding.18 In revealing damaging 
evidence before the grand jury, the witness must expect that such 
evidence will be disclosed at trial. Therefore, any hesitancy that a 
witness might have in divulging harmful evidence before the grand 
jury ordinarily would be based upon a fear of the eventual necessity 
of giving that same evidence in open court rather than the fear that, 
having once given such harmful evidence, his grand jury testimony 
might be divulged. Disclosure of the prior testimony will not unduly 
discourage free statements by witnesses before the grand jury.19 
Second, the disclosure of a witness' grand jury testimony can-
not cause any fear of retaliation or embarrassment that is not al-
ready created by the testimony given in open court. Normally such 
disclosure will only affirm that the same damaging evidence was 
given before the grand jury. Indeed, Wigmore states: 
"If he tells the truth and the truth is the same as he testified 
before the grand jury, the disclosure of the former testimony 
cannot possibly bring to him any harm (in the shape of corporal 
injury or personal ill will) which his testimony on the open trial 
does not equally tend to produce."20 
16. E.g., United States v. Amazon Industrial Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261 (D. Md. 
1931). The Advisory Note to Fro. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) states: 
"2. The rule does not impose any obligation of secrecy on witnesses. The 
existing practice on this point varies among the districts. The seal of secrecy 
on witnesses seems an unnecessary hardship and may lead to injustice if a 
witness is not permitted to make a disclosure to counsel or to an associate." 
17. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 406-07 (1959) 
(dissenting opinion). 
18. E.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936); People v. 
Goldberg,_ 302 Ill. 559, 135 N.E. 84 (1922); State v. McPherson, 114 Iowa 492, 87 N.W. 
421 (1901); State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267 (1874); State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P. 
2d 1002 (1960); Gordon v. Commonwealth, 92 Pa. 216 (1879). 
19. The court in United States v. Ben Grunstein &: Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 
(D.N.J. 1955), recognized the application of this principle in both the criminal prose-
cution and the subsequent civil action arising from the same violation. 
20. 8 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 9, § 2362, at 736. In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. 
v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 406 (1959), Mr. Justice Brennan stated in his dissenting 
opinion: "His [a key prosecution witness] testimony has been extremely damaging. 
Disclosure of his testimony before the grand jury is hardly likely to result in any 
embarrassment that his trial testimony has not already produced." See also State v. 
Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960). 
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Third, a policy of continued secrecy concerning grand jury testi-
mony will have little deterrent effect on the defendant who seeks to 
tamper with or suborn witnesses at his trial.21 If an unscrupulous 
party wishes to tamper with a witness' testimony, he will do so re-
gardless of whether the minutes are made available to him. Once 
he has knowledge of the names of the witnesses who will testify 
against him, which in most jurisdictions is provided prior to trial, 
it is irrelevant to him what was said before the grand jury.22 And 
the prosecution, armed with the grand jury transcript, is fully 
equipped to detect such unlawful conduct.23 Such a possibility 
should not stand as an obstruction to a defendant who seeks only 
to present his best defense and to impeach those testifying against 
him. 24 Certainly such a reason for maintaining secrecy is wholly 
inapplicable once the witness has testified adversely to the defendant, 
since it is then absolutely clear that the witness has not been 
suborned.25 
The abuses inherent in refusing disclosure may be serious in-
deed.26 A person, assured that his grand jury testimony will remain 
forever inviolate, could testify to one thing before the grand jury 
and to something entirely different before the petit jury. And, 
unless the subsequent testimony ran counter to that which the 
prosecution wished to obtain, there would be no way for the defend-
21. See State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959). 
22. The court in Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 653, 102 N.W. 1087, 1093 (1905), 
stated: "[I']he danger of subornation •.• is quite effectually disregarded in modem 
criminal law, which approves the right and procedure by which the accused, in fair• 
ness, is informed before the trial of the witnesses the state relies upon to establish 
the case." The rules of all American jurisdictions concerning the disclosure of wit-
nesses' names prior to trial are set forth and analyzed in 6 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra 
note 6, §§ 1850-55. 
23. See United States v. Ben Grunstein &: Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955). 
24. In Commonwealth v. Mead, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 167 (1858), the court stated: 
"[I]t is clear that the rights of the accused might be greatly affected and his 
peril much increased, if he can be shut out from showing the fact that an im-
portant witness against him is unworthy of credit, or that his testimony before 
the jury trial is to be taken with great caution and doubt because on a previous 
occasion, when called to testify on oath, he had given a different account of the 
same transaction from that which he has stated in his evidence at the trial." 
See also Clanton v. State, 13 Tex. App. 139 (1882). 
25. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 406 (1959) 
(dissenting opinion). 
26. The Sixth Circuit in Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394, 397 (6th Cir. 
1940), recognized the evils and abuses of strict secrecy: 
"It is a serious thing for any man to be indicted for an infamous crime. 
Whether innocent or guilty he cannot escape the ignominy of the accusation, 
the dangers of perjury and error at his trial, the torture of suspense and the 
pains of imprisonment, or the burden of bail. The secrecy of any judicial pro-
cedure is a tempting invitation to the malicious, the ambitious, and the reek.-
less to try to use it to benefit themselves and their friends and to punish their 
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ant to submit the contradiction to the jury.27 It is the policy of the 
law that the truth be ascertained; the state has no interest in con-
victing an accused on the testimony of witnesses who have not been 
as rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the 
evidence permits. No possible injury to the prosecution can arise 
from disclosure of a witness' grand jury testimony. Presumably, it 
will be the same as that given at the trial. However, if inconsisten-
cies or conflicts arise, it is unquestionably in the interest of the 
state as well as of the defendant that such be disclosed and justice 
assured.28 
It is significant to note that, when the prosecution seeks to use 
grand jury testimony to further its own case through impeachment 
of witnesses or refreshment of their recollection, no limitations of 
secrecy exist.29 This has not always been true, for as recent as one 
century ago the state as well as the defendant was barred from in-
vading the secrecy of the grand jury.30 In a series of nineteenth 
century cases, prosecutors set forth the very reasons now urged on 
enemies. If malicious, ambitious or over-zealous men, either in or out of office, 
may with impunity persuade grand juries without any legal evidence, either by 
hearsay testimony, undue influence, or worse means, to indict whom they will, 
and there is no way in which the courts may annul such illegal accusations, the 
grand jury, instead of that protection of 'the citizen against the unfounded 
accusation, whether it comes from the government or be prompted by partisan 
passion, or private enmity' • • • which it was primarily designed to provide, may 
become an engine of oppression and a mockery of justice." 
See also Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D. 
Mass. 1958); United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 19 F.R.D. 122, 126 (D.N.J. 1956); 
State v. Harries, 118 Utah 260, 221 P .2d 605 (1950). 
27. See United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp. 548, 559 (D. Mass. 1960); State 
ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936); State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 
287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960). 
28. See Commonwealth v. Mead, 78 Mass. (12 Gray) 167 (1858); State v. Morgan, 
supra note 27. The court, in Gordon v. United States, 299 F.2d 117, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1962), 
stated: "Whatever invasion of the historic sanctity of grand jury proceedings such 
examination may cause, if any, seems to us outweighed by the additional certainty 
this procedure will lend to the process of verifying as credible the uncorroborated 
testimony of a sole witness for the government." See also Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83 (1963). 
29. United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 (1958); United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Cotter, 60 F.2d 689 
(2d Cir. 1932). For purposes of impeachment, see Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 
303, !108 (1894); Sneed v. United States, 298 Fed. 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1924); for pur-
poses of refreshing recollection, see Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. !147, 377 (1912); 
Putnam v. United States, 162 U.S. 687, 694 (1896); for purposes of refreshing a 
hostile witness, see Felder v. United States, 9 F.2d 872, 874 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. de-
nied, 270 U.S. 648 (1926). But see Rosenthal v. United States, 248 Fed. 684, 686 (8th 
Cir. 1918); for purposes of reading into evidence a confession of defendant before 
the grand jury, see Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 20!1, 206 (9th Cir. 1933). 
!10. People v. Klaw, 53 Misc. 158, 104 N.Y. Supp. 482 (1907). 
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behalf of defendants as grounds for lifting the bar of secrecy once 
the grand jury has been discharged and the accused is in custody.81 
Recognizing that the rule of secrecy may be breached at any 
time by the state and that the witness himself may disclose all,82 a 
growing number of courts have specifically held that the reasons for 
maintaining grand jury secrecy end when that body is discharged 
and the accused is apprehended.33 In lifting the veil of secrecy, 
courts have argued that the rigid maintenance of the rule would 
constitute a bar only to the defendant, who has most at stake in 
learning the truth of the charges brought against him.34 Many 
courts,35 including the United States Supreme Court,86 have at least 
recognized a discretionary power in the courts to permit disclosure 
of such testimony. And a large number of legislatures have, in fact, 
31. In Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 8 N.E. 62 (1886), the state sought to use 
the grand jury testimony of a witness to impeach him. The court, in permitting 
the state to do so, stated: 
"When the indictment is returned, and the defendant arrested and placed 
upon trial, neither statutory nor common law reasons for secrecy can apply. 
There can be no reason, then, why evidence given before a grand jury should 
not be made known, and proved, if the ends of justice require it. A contrary 
course would tend to defeat, instead of to promote justice, and be directly in 
opposition to the tendency of the age, which is to enlarge, rather than to con-
tract, the source of evidence •••. " 
117 Ill. at 437, 8 N.E. at 67. (Emphasis added.) 
See also State v. Bovine, 89 N.J.L. 586, 99 Atl. 313 (1916); State v. Mageske, 119 
Ore. 312, 249 Pac. 364 (1926); State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 50 N.W.2d 439 (1951). 
32. See United States v. Amazon Industrial Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 262 
(D. Md. 1931), where the court stated: "If ••• from such witnesses complete dis-
closure is possible of all testimony given to a grand jury, what is the basis for pro-
hibition against vicarious disclosures in the absence of proof of actual injury." 
33. E.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29, 39 (8th Cir. 1963); United 
States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1959); Metzler v. United States, 64 F.2d 
203, 206 (9th Cir. 1933); State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687 (1936); 
Turk v. Martin, 232 Ky. 479, 23 S.W.2d 937 (1930); State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 
345 P .2d 186, 187 (1959). 
34. See Turk v. Martin, supra note 33; People v. Klaw, 53 Misc. 158, 104 N.Y. 
Supp. 482 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. 1907). 
35. The only noticeable exception is Ohio, where the court has rigidly required 
absolute secrecy. State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910). 
36. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); United 
States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958); United States v. Socony Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) provides in part: 
"Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its delibera-
tions and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the govern-
ment for use in the performance of their duties. Otherwise a juror, attorney, 
interpreter or stenographer may disclose matters occurring before the grand 
jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with 
a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the 
defendant upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the 
indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. No obligation of 
secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this rule." 
See also UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 35, 44 (1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE RULE 
229 (1942); ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ~§ 144-45 (1930). 
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enacted statutes that permit such disclosure for purposes of im-
peachment.87 
In recognizing that a trial judge has inherent discretionary 
power to permit disclosure in the interests of justice, varying views 
have been presented by the courts as to when this power should be 
exercised. Normally, four considerations govern this determination: 
timeliness of the request, scope of the request, delay that the request 
will cause, and extent of the burden placed upon the judge. The im-
portance of these considerations depends substantially on whether 
the request for disclosure is made prior to trial or during trial. 
Ill. PRETRIAL MOTIONS FOR GRAND JURY MINUTES 
A. Pretrial Preparation 
A very limited but perhaps growing number of jurisdictions, 
either by judicial fiat38 or statute, have granted motions for pretrial 
disclosure of grand jury minutes to facilitate pretrial preparation.39 
37. Numerous state statutes provide that a court may require disclosure of testi-
mony of a witness examined before the grand jury in order to ascertain whether 
it is consistent with that given by the witness before the court or to resolve a charge 
of perjury. See Au... CoDE tit. 14 § 272 (1959); Au..sKA COMP. LAws ANN. § 66-8-35 
(1949); ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 106(b), 107; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-930 (1947); CAL. PEN. 
CODE § 938.l; FLA. STAT. § 905.27 (1963); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-lll2 (1948); IND. 
ANN. STAT. §§ 9-816, 9-817 (1956); loWA CODE § 771.24 (1962); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 62-923, 62-925 (1949); KY. CRIM. CoDE §§ IIO, ll3 (Baldwin 1953); M1cH. COMP. 
LAws § 767.19 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.04 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. § 3922 (1959); 
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-6325 (1949); NEV. REv. STAT. § 172.330 (1959); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-5-30 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 259; ORE. REv. STAT. § 132.220 
(1959); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 554 (1956); S.D. CoDE § 34.1226 (1939); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-1612 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10 (1953); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 255.21 
(1957). 
The court stated in State v. Thomas, 99 Mo. 235, 259, 12 S.W. 643, 650 (1889): 
"The evil sought to be remedied, by this legislation, was the immunity, which wit-
nesses might enjoy under the old rule, from prosecution for perjury for swearing 
falsely before the grand jury, and from the discredit which would follow upon the 
deliverance, on trial, in open court, of evidence different from that delivered under 
oath before the grand jury. In other words, to remove, as far as was consistent with 
public policy, the temptation to false swearing before the grand jury." See also 
State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960). Most of these statutes were first 
enacted during a period when grand jury minutes were not regularly kept, and thus 
only the grand juror's testimony was available for purpoSl's of impeachment. Courts 
construing these provisions have permitted grand jury minutes to be disclosed when 
kept, in lieu of a grand juror's testimony, because they are more reliable. See 
State v. Morgan, supra. Contra, State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 50 N.W.2d 439 (1951). 
See also State v. McPherson, 114 Iowa 492, 87 N.W. 421 (1901). 
38. E.g., State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959); State v. Moffa, 
64 N.J. Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (1960); State v. Fame, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 
(1959); see also People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 
(1927). 
39. In an analogous situation, numerous courts in civil antitrust actions have 
permitted pretrial disclosure of grand jury minutes. See Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. 
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These jurisdictions have concluded that, because such evidence is 
often of grave importance to a defendant for purposes of impeach-
ing prosecution witnesses, he should be entitled to the grand jury 
minutes at some time during the trial. And once the prosecution 
has indicated those witnesses who will testify for the state, which in 
most jurisdictions is prior to trial, there is no apparent reason for 
thereafter withholding their grand jury testimony. These jurisdic-
tions have found through experience that the more restrictive prac-
tice of requiring counsel to wait until each witness has testified 
before requesting disclosure is both cumbersome and time-consum-
ing, inasmuch as counsel must be given sufficient time after each 
request to examine the minutes and evaluate the testimony for 
purposes of impeachment.4.0 Pretrial disclosure, on the other hand, 
affords a timely and unfettered opportunity to prepare fully cross-
examination and impeachment and thus facilitates the orderly and 
efficient handling of witnesses.41 Four states have provided by statute 
that, after the indictment is returned, a defendant upon demand 
must be provided with a copy of the grand jury minutes in advance 
of trial.42 
City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1963); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance 
Co., 313 F.2d 431, 434 (2d Cir. 1963); Nairn v. Clary, 312 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1963); 
City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 486, 491 (E.D. Pa. 
1962); United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960); Herman 
Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1958); United 
States v. Ben Grunstein &: Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955); In re Special 1952 
Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102, 104 (E.D. Pa. 1958). Compare Doe v. Rosenberry, 255 F.2d 
118 (2d Cir. 1958); In the Matter of the October 1959 Grand Jury, 184 F. Supp. 38 
(E.D. Va. 1960); In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C. 1952); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283 (E.D. Pa. 1933). 
40. See State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P .2d 186 (1959). 
41. See State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959); State v. Moffa, 
64 N.J. Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (1960). 
42. See CAL. PEN. CoDE § 938.1; IowA CoDE § 772.4 (1962); KY. CRIM. CODE § 110 
(Baldwin 1953); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.04 (1947). 
The experience of these states in permitting disclosure indicates that the dangers 
repeatedly urged are seriously overrated. California, for example, since 1897 has followed 
the procedure of providing a defendant in a criminal prosecution with a copy of the 
transcript of the grand jury testimony before trial. Such practice became compulsory 
in all cases with the passage of an amendment in 1927 which provided that transcripts 
be made of all grand jury testimony and supplied to defendant. The present California 
statute provides in part: 
"If an indictment has been found or accusation presented against a defendant, 
such stenographic reporter shall certify and file with the county clerk an original 
transcription of his shorthand notes and a copy thereof and as many additional 
copies as there are defendants .••• The county clerk shall deliver the original of 
the transcript so filed with him to the distnct attorney immediately upon his 
receipt thereof, shall return one copy for use only by judges in proceedings 
relating to the indictment or accusation, and shall deliver a copy of such transcript 
upon each such defendant or his attorney." 
CAL. PEN. ConE § 938.1. 
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The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, have emphatically 
denied pretrial disclosure for purposes of trial preparation.43 Judge 
Learned Hand eloquently set forth some of the reasons for this in 
United States v. Garsson: 
"I am no more disposed to grant it than I was in 1909. U.S. v. 
Violon (C.C. 173 Fed. 501). It is said to lie in discretion, and 
perhaps it does, but no judge of this court has granted it, and 
I hope none ever will. Under our criminal procedure the ac-
cused has every advantage. While the prosecution is held 
rigidly to the charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of 
his defense. He is immune from question or comment on his 
silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the least fair 
doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve. Why in addition 
he should in advance have the whole evidence against him to 
pick over at his leisure, and make his defense, fairly or foully, 
I have never been able to see."44 
Thus, as partially outlined by Judge Hand, three reasons have been 
advanced by courts for withholding the disclosure of grand jury 
testimony until after a witness has testified: (1) disclosure would 
give the mute defendant an unfair advantage over the prosecution, 
which alone would be required to expose its entire case prior to 
trial; (2) disclosure would enable the defendant to procure per-
jured testimony in order to set up a false defense; and (3) disclosure 
would encourage the defendant to bribe or intimidate prosecution 
witnesses in order to induce reluctance to testify at trial. 
But these arguments lose much of their force when exposed to 
a careful examination. First, only the most naive practitioner would 
suggest that the indigent and the ignorant, who comprise the great 
majority of the defendants tried in our courts today, could ever have 
Legal scholars discussing the California statute, as well as those of Kentucky, Iowa, 
and Minnesota, agree that such pretrial disclosure has had no adverse effect; 
the grand jury has remained a vital and active force in these states. See Goldstein, 
The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 
II49, II84 n.II6 (1960); Kennedy &: Briggs, Historical and Legal Aspects of the 
California Grand Jury System, 43 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 251 (1955); Louisell, Criminal 
Discovery: Dilemma Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 56, 71 n.59 (1961); Seltzer 
Pre-Trial Discovery of Grand Jury Testimony in Criminal Cases, 66 DICK. L. R.Ev. 379 
(1962); Sherry, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 VA. L. R.Ev. 
668 (1962); Note, 48 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 160, 161-62 (1960). 
43. E.g., United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958). But see 
United States v. Procter &: Gamble Co., 187 F. Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960), where the district 
court upon remand found a "particularized need" and permitted partial pretrial dis-
covery of the grand jury -minutes); United States v. Wortman, 26 F.R.D. 183 (E.D. 
Ill. 1960). Contra, United States v. Byoir, 147 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1945). 
44. 291 Fed. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
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an advantage over the state, which has massive investigative machin-
ery, criminal experts, laboratories, and other investigative mediums, 
all of which aid the prosecution in keeping abreast of the modern 
techniques for the detection and prevention of crime. All too fre-
quently, little or no investigation is available to such a defendant, 
and state witnesses are reluctant to talk to defense counsel.415 More-
over, the right of a defendant to remain silent would seem at times 
to be spurious: "We all know that the right to conduct prolonged 
questioning of suspects is vigorously championed by law enforce-
ment authorities. . . . Success very frequently crowns the effort, it 
the proportion of guilty pleas and convictions resting on confessions 
affords a reliable guide."46 It is rare indeed that the prosecution is 
surprised by the defense, but the element of surprise is always a 
grave danger to the defendant. Furthermore, talk of "disadvantage" 
to the state assumes that criminal trials are contests in which the 
state's sole aim is to win. Any suggestion that the state must have 
at least as good a chance to prevail as the defendant would seem to 
violate the traditional policy of favoring the defendant in order to 
avoid conviction of the innocent.47 
Second, in response to the argument that discovery would lead 
to a perjured defense, the words of Mr. Justice Brennan are apropos: 
"[HJ ow can we be so positive criminal discovery will produce per-
jured defenses when we have in tliis country virtually shut the door 
to all such discovery?"48 In fact, pretrial discovery of grand jury 
45. "It should with equal candor be conceded that a deficiency in our present 
handling of criminal matters is the lack of adequate facilities of factual investigation 
by defendants. State v. Johnson, 28 N.J. 133, 142 (1958)." State v. Moffa, 64 N.J. Super. 
69, 71-72, 165 A.2d 219, 220 (1960). 
46. Brennan, Remarks on Discovery, 33 F.R.D. 47, 64 (1963). See also STEWART, 
FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 155 (1945). But see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478 (1964). 
In the Criminal Court of Cook County for the year 1963 there were 2,744 defendants 
brought to trial, and, of this number, 2,185 pleaded guilty. Annual Report of Criminal 
Court of Cook County, Fiscal Year, January 1, 1963-December 31, 1963. 
47. Polstein, How To "Settle" a Criminal Case, Practical Lawyer, Jan. 1962, pp. 35, 
43, states: 
"Even though the cards are not arranged by the prosecutor or judge, the fact 
remains that any criminal prosecution is inherently unfair to the defendant, 
semantic presumptions of innocence notwithstanding. The defendant is not being 
sued for some real or imagined civil debt. He is being accused of a crime against 
the community, an assault upon the status quo. The plaintiff is the People. The 
complaint doesn't contain vague allegations drawn by some lawyer trying to earn 
a fee, but is an indictment returned by a grand jury. Plaintiff's counsel is no 
unknown attorney, but the public prosecutor. 'Accused,' 'crime,' 'grand jury,' 'in• 
dictment,' 'district attorney,' 'People'-these are words that evoke emotional 
response. All of the majesty of the law, all the dignity of the prosecutor's office, 
all of the outrage of the community, is working to the prejudice of the defendant." 
See also Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154 (1963). 
48. See Brennan, supra note 46, at 62. 
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minutes would have exactly the opposite effect. It would reduce 
the likelihood that a witness' testimony at the trial was not perjured 
since both the state and the defendant would know the content of 
those proceedings. "The possibility that a dishonest accused will 
misuse such an opportunity is no reason for committing the injustice 
of refusing the honest accused a fair means of clearing himself. That 
argument is outworn; it was the basis (and with equal logic) for 
the one-time refusal of the criminal law . . . to allow the accused 
to produce any witnesses at all."49 Furthermore, the guilty defend-
ant, necessarily acquainted with the details of the crime that the 
state must prove, can fabricate a defense accordingly, regardless of 
whether he has obtained disclosure of the grand jury minutes. 
Finally, the defendant who will resort to intimidation or other 
means to silence state witnesses will do so regardless of whether he 
knows the content of their grand jury testimony. As noted above, 
listing state witnesses prior to trial enables a defendant to gain 
access to their names and addresses, which is all such a defendant 
needs to know to perpetrate his wrong. 
Unquestionably, the abolition of the grand jury system in Eng-
land in 1933 110 and the growing use of the information rather than 
grand jury indictment in America demonstrate the fallacy of many 
of the arguments expressed by those opposing pretrial disclosure.111 
Under the present English system, a defendant obtains full discovery 
of the testimonial evidence that is in the hands of the prosecutor 
prior to trial, and the prosecution is limited at the trial to the 
evidence disclosed at the preliminary hearing. 
Perhaps most jurisdictions are reluctant at this time to liberalize 
their rules of discovery to the extent of permitting pretrial inspec-
tion of grand jury minutes, but the experience of those that have 
demonstrates that no vitality is drained from the effort or success 
of the state in its prosecution of criminals. 
49. Id. at 63 (Remarks of Dean Wigmore). 
50. The Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23 &: 24 
Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1. The abolition was effected on a plea of economy. On the merits, the 
reform in the procedure of the preliminary examination and the separation of the 
functions of the police and the justice of the peace had made the grand jury less essen-
tial. The argument for retention, that the grand jury might be a protection of accused 
persons against oppression, did not convince the English. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
FROM ARREST TO APPEAL (1947). See also Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English 
Grand Jury, 29 J. CRIM. L., C. &: P.S. 3, 20 (1938); Seltzer, Pre-Trial Discovery of Grand 
Jury Testimony in Criminal Cases, 66 DICK. L. REv. 379 (1962). 
51. In Kansas and Wyoming, for example, the grand jury is seldom employed. In 
the former it is employed only by a petition signed by taxpayers and addressed to the 
court. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-901 (1949). In the latter it is employed only upon 
order of a district court. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-92 (1957). 
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B. Defense Against a Charge of Perjury 
Most jurisdictions that have considered the question have held 
that a person indicted for making perjurious statements before a 
grand jury has a right to inspect the minutes of his own statements 
before trial.52 Not only is this right fully recognized as essential to the 
preparation of the defendant's case,53 but refusal to grant inspection 
has been held to deny him a fair trial.54 Recognizing this, a number 
of states have enacted legislation permitting disclosure in such a 
case.55 
It is clear that, inasmuch as the testimony sought is that of the 
defendant himself, no danger of intimidation or subornation of 
prosecution witnesses will result. The minutes requested here are 
not to be used for "the relatively negative purpose of impeaching a 
witness," but rather to afford the defendant an opportunity to pre-
pare an affirmative defense.56 Of critical importance to this defense 
is a showing of what had gone on before and after the critical ques-
tions and answers since this might shed light on how the defendant 
understood the questions and what he meant by his answers.117 
Moreover, the excising of words here and there by the prosecution 
can radically change the meaning of what transpired. A witness is 
not always able to remember in detail his testimony before the grand 
jury; consequently, a refusal to permit him to examine the minutes 
52. E.g., Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1959); United States 
v. Alu, 246 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1957); United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617 (lid Cir. 
1954); United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 
907 (1952); In re Bullock, 103 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.D.C. 1952); United States v. White, 
104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952); Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959); People v. 
Calandrillo, 29 Misc. 2d 495,215 N.Y.S.2d 364 (Suffolk County Ct. 1961). But see State v. 
Brinkley, 354 Mo. 337, 189 S.W .2d 314 (1945), where the court held that a refusal to 
permit inspection is a proper exercise of discretion. See also United States v. Wortman, 
26 F.R.D. 183 (D. Ill. 1960); United States v. Owen, 11 F.R.D. 371 (W.D. Mo. 1951); 
Commonwealth v. Ries, 337 Mass. 565, 150 N.E.2d 527 (1958); State ex rel. Clagett 
v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959). 
53. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 403 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion). 
54. See Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 1958). 
55. See, e.g., ALAsKA CODE CRIM. PROC. 6; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 106(b); ARK. STAT. ANN. 
§ 43-930 (1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 924.2; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1112 (1948); IND. ANN. 
STAT.§ 9-817 (1956); loWA CODE§ 771.23 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§§ 62-923, 62-925 
(1949); KY. CRIM. CoDE § 110 (Baldwin, 1953); LA. REv. STAT. § 15:471 (1950); MICH, 
COMP. LAws § 767.19 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.65 (1947); Mo. REv. STAT. § 3922 
(1959); MONT. REv. CODES ANN.§ 94--6325 (1949); NEV. REv. STAT.§ 172.330 (1959); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 41-5-30 (1953); N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 259; OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 §§ 341, 
342 (1961); ORE. REv. STAT. § 132.220 (1959); P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 34, § 554 (1956); 
S.D. CODE § 34.1226 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-1612 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-9 
(1953); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 255.20 (1957). 
56. See United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1951). 
57. See United States v. White, 104 F. Supp. 120 (D.N.J. 1952). 
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in order to fill in the gaps left by the prosecution could work to his 
prejudice. 
Thus, in view of the fact that none of the frequently urged 
reasons for secrecy could have any application, basic rules of fair-
ness dictate that a defendant indicted for perjury be given a full 
transcript of his testimony before the grand jury. This transcript 
is, after all, the very gravamen of such a criminal proceeding. 
C. Motion To Dismiss the Indictment 
One of the more difficult problems concerning requests for pre-
trial disclosure of grand jury minutes arises when the request is 
made in support of a motion to dismiss or quash the indictment.58 
Whether disclosure will be granted is normally determined, not by 
considerations of secrecy, but rather by two other considerations: 
whether the motion on its face raises a constitutional question re-
quiring dismissal of the indictment if proved and whether the 
motion and supporting papers demonstrate that the motion was 
made in good faith. Addressing the first of these issues, courts have 
been faced repeatedly with the constitutional questions of whether 
indictments are valid when (1) based on insufficient, incompetent, 
or hearsay evidence, (2) based on no legal evidence whatever, (3) 
based on perjured testimony, (4) based on coerced confessions or 
illegally seized evidence, (5) returned by a prejudiced or biased 
grand jury, or (6) returned against an accused granted immunity by 
a constitutional or statutory provision. In order to determine 
whether disclosure will be granted, then, it is necessary to consider 
first whether the motion to dismiss in each of these categories raises a 
constitutional question. If such a question is raised, the second issue 
of a good faith showing becomes relevant. 
1. Insufficient, incompetent, or hearsay evidence. In Costello v. 
United States/''9 the Supreme Court held that it does not violate 
the fifth amendment to retain the presumption of validity of an 
indictment, even though the defendant alleges it was returned 
on the basis of hearsay evidence. 
"An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased 
grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if 
valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the 
merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more."60 
58. See generally Note, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1154 (1963). 
59. 350 U.S. 359 (1956). 
60. Id. at 363. 
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Consistent with this decision, with relatively few exceptions,61 
both state and federal courts have long held that a request for grand 
jury minutes will be denied when sought in order to prove that 
an indictment was based upon insufficient, incompetent, or hear-
say evidence.62 So strong is the presumption that the grand jury 
acted on sufficient evidence63 that it is the rare case in which the 
matter will be considered further.64 
The reasons dictating foreclosure of this question are not based 
upon considerations of secrecy, but rather upon the abuses a con-
trary policy would invite. As the Supreme Court in Costello ob-
served, if indictments were held open to challenge on grounds that 
insufficient, incompetent, or hearsay evidence was received, "the 
resulting delay would be great indeed." Every defendant, prior to 
trial, could insist upon "a kind of preliminary trial to determine 
the competency and adequacy of the evidence before the grand 
jury."65 Thus, this constitutional question was resolved in Costello 
by the practical considerations that the Court held might give rise 
-to serious abuse. 
2. No legal evidence. Where, however, it is alleged that the 
grand jury had before it no legal evidence whatever, a more difficult 
constitutional question is posed. Most courts agree that the indict-
ment under these circumstances must be quashed.66 Although the 
61. New York State is perhaps the only notable exception; although cognizant of 
the problems of extended pretrial litigation, its courts will quash indictments returned 
on the basis of incompetent or insufficient evidence. E.g., People v. Howell, 3 N.Y.2d 
672, 148 N.E.2d 867 (1958); People v. Bareika, 9 App. Div. 2d 1002, 195 N.Y.S.2d 97 
(1959). See also Note, lll U. PA. L. REv. ll54 (1963). 
62. Cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); Kastel v. United States, 23 
F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927); Simpson v. United States, 11 F.2d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 1926), 
cert. denied, 271 U.S. 674 (1926); United States v. Foster, 80 F. Supp. 479 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948); State v. Shawley, 334 Mo. 352, 67 S.W.2d 74 (1933); State v. Selby, 126 N.E.2d 
606 (C.P. Ohio 1955); State v. Reyes, 209 Ore. 595, 308 P.2d 182 (1957); State v. Broad-
hurst, 184 Ore. 178, 196 P.2d 407 (1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 906 (1949). 
63. "There is a strong presumption of regularity accorded to the findings of a grand 
jury." Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29, 39 (8th Cir. 1963), cert denied, 
373 U.S. 904 (1963). 
64. The Eighth Circuit recognized the invalidity of indictments based solely on 
incompetent evidence, Nanfito v. United States, 20 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1927), or sup-
ported by insufficient evidence, Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1928). 
See also United States v. Perlman, 247 Fed. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1917); United States v. 
Bolles, 209 Fed. 682, 684 (W .D. Mo. 1913); United States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. !143 
(N.D.N.Y. 1881); United States v. Reed, 27 Fed. Cas. 727, 735 (No. 16134) (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 
1852). 
65. 350 U.S. at 363. 
66. "[W]hen the court can see that the finding of a grand jury is based upon such 
utterly insufficient evidence, or such palpably incompetent evidence, as to indicate 
that the indictment resulted from prejudice, or was found in wilful disregard of the 
rights of the accused, the court should interfere and quash the indictment." United 
States v. Farrington, 5 Fed. 343, 348 (N.D.N.Y. 1881). See also Cochran v. United States, 
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Supreme Court has not ruled expressly on this point, Mr. Justice 
Burton, in his concurring opinion in the Costello case, stated: "[I] t 
seems to me that if it is shown that the grand jury had before it no 
substantial or rationally persuasive evidence upon which to base 
its indictment, that indictment should be quashed."67 And Judge 
Learned Hand, dealing with the same case at the court of appeals 
level, ruled that "if no evidence had been offered that rationally 
established the facts, the indictment ought to be quashed."68 
Courts have not established clear guidelines with respect to what 
must be alleged in the motions and substantiated by attached affida-
vits in order for a defendant to receive a ruling requiring disclosure 
of grand jury minutes. It would seem, however, that a mere allega-
tion that there was no legal evidence before the grand jury should 
be sufficient to require the judge to examine the minutes in camera. 
A cursory examination by the judge would certainly establish with 
minimum delay whether grounds existed for the defendant's motion. 
The judge could then either grant or deny disclosure atcordingly. 
3. Perjured testimony. When perjured testimony is the sole 
evidence upon which the indictment is returned, the indictment 
must be quashed. In Coppedge v. United States,69 the Supreme 
Court considered this question, and, although it did not pass on it 
directly, it intimated that inspection of grand jury minutes in such 
a situation might be required.70 Upon remand, the lower court per-
mitted the defendant to examine the grand jury minutes in their 
entirety but ultimately dismissed the motion to quash after con-
cluding that there was sufficient non-perjurious evidence to sustain 
the indictment.71 
Unquestionably, if the defendant has established in his motion 
that the grand jury was exposed to perjurious testimony, the court 
should make at least an in camera inspection in order to determine 
whether other, independent competent evidence upon which an 
!HO F.2d 585, 590-91 (8th Cir. 1962); United States v. Lydecker, 275 Fed. 976 (W .D.N.Y. 
1921); State ex rel. Clagett v. James, 327 S.W.2d 278 (Mo. 1959); Annot. 59 A.L.R. 567 
(1929). 
67. 350 U.S. at 364. 
68. United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 677 (2d Cir. 1955), afj'd, 350 U.S. 359 
(1956). Additionally, when it is alleged that there was no evidence to prove an element 
of the crime, inspection will be permitted. Brady v. United States, 24 F.2d 405 (8th 
Cir. 1928); People v. Barieka, 11 App. Div. 2d 567, 199 N.Y.S.2d 1007 (1959); People v. 
Stecker, 140 Misc. 684, 252 N.Y. Supp. 185 (N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. 1931). 
69. 369 U.S. 438 (1962). 
70. Id. at 458-59. 
71. See Coppedge v. United States, 311 F.2d 128 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
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indictment could be sustained was offered. The burden placed upon 
the court is not great, and the requirement that a defendant estab-
lish, in the first instance, that perjury was committed assures that 
the motion is made in good faith. 
4. Coerced confessions, illegally seized evidence. Similarly, when 
an indictment based entirely on the coerced confession of the de-
fendant or on illegally seized evidence is returned, it must be dis-
missed as violative of the defendant's constitutional rights.72 
The Supreme Court has held, however, that the mere suspicion 
that wrongfully seized evidence was presented to the grand jury is 
insufficient.to warrant inspection of the minutes.73 Such a rule, as a 
practical matter, would seem unduly restrictive. Certainly when 
the trial judge considers the motion to suppress the illegally seized 
evidence or the coerced confession, he could also make an in camera 
inspection of the grand jury minutes in order to determine whether 
the evidence ordered suppressed was the only evidence before the 
grand jury. If he so finds, the motion to dismiss and the motion to 
suppress could be granted without additional delay. 
5. Prejudiced or biased grand jury. The Supreme Court has not 
directly ruled that the fourteenth amendment requires that an in-
dictment be returned by an unprejudiced and unbiased grand jury. 
In Beck v. W ashington,74 the Court stated that "it may be true that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the 
State, having once resorted to a grand jury procedure, to furnish an 
unbiased grand jury."75 After examining the grand jury minutes in 
that case, however, the Court concluded that there was no prejudice 
and therefore declined to determine the constitutional question. 
The dissenting Justices, Black, Douglas, and Chief Justice Warren, 
made it clear in their opinion that the Constitution will tolerate no 
lesser standard than freedom from prejudice.76 And Justice Burton 
stated in another case, "I assume that this Court would not preclude 
an examination of grand jury action to ascertain the existence of 
bias or prejudice in an indictment."77 In Costello, the full Court 
did state as dictum that "an indictment returned by a legally 
constituted78 and unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is 
72. See Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958). See also Holt v. United States, 
218 U.S. 245 (1910). 
73. See United States v. Lawn, 355 U.S. 339 (1958). 
74. 369 U.S. 541 (1962). 
75. Id. at 546. 
76. Id. at 558, 579. 
77. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956). 
78. The selection of grand jurors under state law as well as federal is held to close 
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enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits."79 From these 
statements, one might reasonably conclude that the constitutional 
standards enumerated by the dissent in the Beck case are the law of 
the land.80 
A mere allegation that the jury was biased or prejudiced, with-
out some factual support, will unquestionably fail as a basis for 
obtaining disclosure. However, when the defendant, through affida-
vits or otherwise, is able to establish good grounds for his motion to 
dismiss, as in the Beck case, disclosure should be permitted and 
further consideration given by the court. Denial of examination in 
the latter instance would give rise to serious abuse and would be a 
basic infringement upon a defendant's constitutional rights. 
6. Privilege against self-incrimination. An accused who is called 
by the prosecution as a witness before the grand jury and who 
presents evidence tending to sustain an indictment against him is 
protected by his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination81 
and is immune from prosecution based upon his testimony.82 Like-
wise, a defendant who is granted statutory immunity has a right to 
move that an indictment against him be quashed or dismissed.83 
scrutiny by the Supreme Court and must conform to minimum constitutional stand-
ards. Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942). 
79. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). (Emphasis added.) 
80. Irregularities occurring during the grand jury hearing such as the presence of 
unauthorized persons or misconduct of the state's attorney have also been held as 
grounds for allowing inspection of minutes and dismissal of an indictment. E.g., 
Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1963); United States v. 
Amazon Industrial Chem. Corp., 55 F.2d 254, 261-62 (D. Md. 1931); Coblentz v. State, 
164 Md. 558, 166 Atl. 45 (1933); Lobowitch v. Commonwealth, 235 Mass. 357, 126 N.E. 
831 (1920). See also United States v. Remington, 191 F.2d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 1951); 
United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir. 1944); State ex rel. 
Reichert v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 129, 73 N.E.2d-174 (1947). 
81. See Jones v. United States, 327 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Mulloney v. United 
States, 79 F.2d 566 (1st Cir. 1935); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677 
(S.D.N.Y. 1953); United States v. Miller, 80 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Pa. 1948); United States 
v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); People v. Steuding, 6 N.Y.2d 214, 160 N.E.2d 
468 (1959). There is no waiver of this privilege by failure to invoke it, and, unless the 
accused is properly warned of the privilege and has knowingly waived it, he may move 
to quash the indictment. United States v. Lawn, supra. See also United States v. Cleary, 
265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1959); Mencheca v. State, 28 S.W. 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894); 
State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24, 139 N.W. 514 (1913); Malloy v. Hogan, 374 U.S. 1 (1964); 
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
82. The federal constitution and the constitutions of all but two states include 
language relating specifically to self-incrimination. See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2252 
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Cf. United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 1962 Trade Cas. 
1 70,498 (N.D. Pa. 1962); United States v. Kimball, 117 Fed. 156, 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); 
United States v. Jones, 69 Fed. 973, 978 (D. Nev. 1895); People v. Macner, 171 Misc. 
720, 13 N.Y.S.2d 451 (Oneida County Ct. 1939). 
83. E.g., United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1944); Havenor 
v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N.W. 116 (1905); Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 102 N.W. 
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Under such circumstances, courts have expressed little reluctance 
to set aside the veil of secrecy and to permit the defendant to inspect 
the grand jury minutes, as the minutes sought are those of the de-
fendant's own testimony.84 Furthermore, the purpose for which they 
are sought is narrow, being limited to the question of whether the 
defendant's constitutional and statutory rights have been violated. 
The foregoing discussion suggests varying constitutional prob-
lems, some resolved and others unresolved. Unquestionably, when 
clear constitutional questions are raised by a motion to dismiss or 
quash, stronger reasons are presented for giving a defendant com-
plete freedom to inspect the grand jury minutes. Certainly, no 
policy of grand jury secrecy should impede a determination of 
constitutional questions. 
IV. MOTION FOR GRAND JURY MINUTES DURING TRIAL 
A. For Purposes of Impeachment 
The real cudgel of an unrealistic policy of grand jury secrecy 
strikes a defendant hardest when he seeks inspection for purposes 
of impeaching a prosecution witness. Such a request is normally 
made after the witness sought to be impeached has testified and the 
reasons for secrecy are nonexistent.85 Nearly all jurisdictions recog-
nize that the trial court has discretionary power to permit disclosure 
for purposes of impeachment, but many courts have never exercised 
this power. 
The Supreme Court in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United 
States86 held that, under rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 87 the trial court has discretionary power to permit dis-
closure when a "particularized need" exists, such as to "impeach a 
witness, to refresh his recollection, to test his credibility and the 
1087 (1905). See also Edwards v. United States, 312 U.S. 473 (1941); United States v. 
Onassis, 125 F. Supp. 190 (D.C.D.C. 1954). 
84. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra, for discussion of inspection of minutes 
in connection with perjury indictments. 
85. The witness, having testified adversely, has lost his anonymity. Moreover, the 
possibility of intimidation in additon to that created when he gives the same damaging 
evidence in open trial can be at most slight. No general searching for evidence i! 
involved here (as where general discovery is sought) because only the testimony of a 
particular witness is desired. Also, when the testimony is sought after the witness has 
testified, it can be effectively limited to the subject matter developed on direct exam-
ination, a limitation which is not possible with pretrial disclosure. 
86. 360 U.S. 395 (1959). 
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). 
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like."88 The majority stated (and the dissent agreed)89 that to es-
tablish a "particularized need," a defendant is not required to 
show inconsistencies between the trial and the grand jury testimony 
before disclosure could be granted "for the defense will rarely be 
able to lay a foundation for obtaining grand jury testimony by 
showing it is inconsistent with trial testimony unless it can inspect 
the grand jury testimony . . . ."90 
Three distinct views have been expressed by various courts with 
regard to disclosure for purposes of impeaching a witness. The 
dissent in Pittsburgh Plate Glass held that the trial judge, upon re-
quest and after a witness has testified, should hold an in camera 
inspection of the grand jury testimony and turn over that portion 
. that covers the subject matter of the witness' testimony at the trial.91 
Patterning this rule after the Jencks rule, 92 which pertains to wit-
nesses' statements, the dissent reasoned that only the defense is ade-
quately equipped to determine the usefulness of such testimony for 
88. 360 U.S. at 399. In this case the defendants claimed that they had a "right" to 
inspect the grand jury testimony of a key prosecution witness. The Government had 
offered to let the trial judge screen the testimony and to allow inspection of material 
portions, an offer that the defendants rejected. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's denial of disclosure, holding that no such right existed. Cf. United States v. 
Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 881 (1961); Continental 
Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 146 (6th Cir. 1960); United States v. Killian, 
275 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1960). 
89. The dissent of Mr. Justice Brennan, in which Mr. Chief Justice Warren and 
Justices Black and Douglas joined, concluded that, once the witness had testified, 
there were no valid considerations militating in favor of continued secrecy; simple 
justice required that the defendants be given a fair opportunity to refute the Gov-
ernment's case. 360 U.S. at 405. 
90. Id. at 408. See United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961); United 
States v. Zborowski, 271 F.2d 661, 666 (2d Cir. 1959); Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 
928 (10th Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion); cf. State v. Morgan, 67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 
1002 (1960). Many courts in the past required, and some still require, a defendant to 
meet this insurmountable burden. See, e.g., Hance v. United States, 299 F.2d 389 (8th 
Cir. 1962); Brilliant v. United States, 297 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1962); Berry v. United States, 
295 F.2d 192, 194-96 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 955 (1962); Bary v. United 
States, 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961); United States v. Magin, 280 F.2d 74 {7th Cir. 1960); 
Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928 (10th Cir. 1959); Herzog v. United States, 226 F.2d 
561 (9th Cir. 1955), afj'd en bane, 235 F.2d 664, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 844 (1956). 
91. In its brief in the Pittsburgh Plate Glass case, the Government suggested that 
the trial court had discretionary power to refuse even to inspect the minutes. Brief 
of Appellee, pp. 39-40. Cf. Beatrice Foods Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 
1963); Herzog v. United States, supra note 90; Minton v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959). 
The strong dissent and silence of the majority indicates the Court has not prescribed 
this view. 
92. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). The Jencks rule provides that the 
Government, upon motion by the defendant after a government witness has testified, 
must produce for in camera inspection by the judge any documents in its possession 
that touch upon matters testified to by the witness. Defendant need not make a 
prior showing of inconsistency. The rule is now embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958). 
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purposes of impeachment and even the most able and experienced 
trial judge, who is hard pressed by the pressures of conducting a 
trial, would be unable to determine which parts of the grand jury 
testimony would be useful in impeaching a witness.93 The experi-
ence under the Jencks rule has indicated that such a procedure has 
caused no undue delay, nor have the courts been unduly burdened. 
To a limited extent, this rule has been followed by the Circuit 
Court for the District of Columbia.94 
A different view has been adopted by the Second Circuit. That 
court has held that upon request of the defendant, after a witness 
has testified, the trial judge must examine in camera the grand jury 
testimony of the witness for inconsistencies; if such inconsistencies 
exist, the testimony of the witness must be made available to de-
fense counsel.95 Under this rule, secrecy is maintained until incon-
sistencies are found to exist by the trial judge. The arguments urged 
against such a rule are (1) a trial judge is not as well equipped as 
trial counsel to determine the impeachment value of grand jury 
testimony;96 (2) a serious burden is placed on the trial judge if an 
93. 360 U.S. at 409. The dissent quoted at great length from Jencks v. United 
States, supra note 92: 
"Flat contradiction between the witness' testimony and the version of the events 
given in his reports is not the only test of inconsistency. The omission from 
the reports of facts related at the trial, or a contrast in emphasis upon the same 
facts, even a different order of treatment, are also relevant to the cross-examining 
process of testing the credibility of a witness' trial testimony." 
See also People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881 (1961). 
94. The court in De Binder v. United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961), held 
that when there is a single or key prosecution witness upon whose credibility the 
prosecution's case depends, the trial court should allow disclosure without a prior 
in camera inspection for inconsistencies. See Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324 
(D.C. Cir. 1962); Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also 
Atwell v. United States, 162 Fed. 97 (4th Cir. 1908). 
95. E.g., United States v. Giampa, 290 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1961); United States v. 
Hernandez, 282 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669 (2d 
Cir. 1959); United States v. Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1958); United States v. 
Alper, 156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946); cf. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 
1962). See also United States v. Coduto, 284 F.2d 464 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 
881 (1961), where the Seventh Circuit indicated that it might adopt the rule of the 
Second Circuit. The Seventh Circuit, in a more recent decision, United States v. 
Micele, 327 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1964), held that, when the witnesses are key prosecution 
witnesses, an in camera inspection is required. The Court also noted that "possible" 
inconsistencies were suggested by a stricken answer and the fact that the witnesses 
in question were accomplices and felons, thereby establishing a "particularized need." 
96. Cf. Berry v. United States, 295 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
955 (1962); Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1961); Minton v. State, llll 
So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959). As pointed out in these cases, this procedure makes the judge 
a fact finder for the defense, and he would be acting as "associate counsel" in a 
manner contrary to every concept of judicial functions. See also Herzog v. United 
States, 226 F.2d 561 (9th Cir. 1955), affd en bane, 235 F.2d 664, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 
844 (1956); United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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in camera investigation is requested after each prosecution witness 
has testified;97 (3) such a procedure would cause repeated delays in 
the trial; and (4) every defendant would embark on a "fishing 
expedition" and request an in camera inspection for every state 
witness with the hope of finding inconsistencies.98 -0 
In actual practice, however, these objections to the Second Cir-
<:uit rule have not been as formidable as they might first appear 
in a factual vacuum. If, upon an in camera examination, in-
consistencies are not found to exist by the trial judge, the minutes 
are sealed and may be reviewed by the appellate court, thereby 
permitting a further examination for inconsistencies or impeaching 
material.DD This additional judicial examination, apart from the 
exigencies of the trial, is certainly sufficient assurance that the rights 
of the defendant will be protected.100 Also, in a criminal case such 
as rape or robbery where there might be only one or two key 
prosecution witnesses, the burden of requiring an in camera inspec-
tion is minimal. The assurance that these witnesses are credible 
and worthy of belief more than offsets this slight delay in trial 
time.101 Furthermore, the experience gained from the protracted 
electrical industry antitrust litigation has demonstrated that even 
in a multi-witness trial the fear of burdening the court with in 
camera inspections of the grand jury testimony has not material-
ized.102 In conducting the depositions of numerous witnesses in that 
litigation, the courts have read grand jury minutes just prior to or 
during the depositions themselves. When inconsistencies have been 
found, the courts have ordered the entire grand jury minutes dis-
closed to counsel. More recently in United States v. Johns-Manville 
97. Herzog v. United States, supra note 96 ("not only is the latter course a 'fishing 
expedition,' but the judge is chumming the fish for the fisherman'); Jackson v. 
United States, 297 F.2d 195 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
98. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 409-10 (1959) (dis-
senting opinion). 
99. United States v. Guido, 327 F.2d 222 (7th Cir. 1964); United States v. Santore, 
290 F.2d 51, 67 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 
502 (2d Cir. 1956). 
100. Parr v. United States, 265 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1959); People v. Dales, 309 N.Y. 
97, 127 N.E.2d 829 (1955). 
101. See Gordan v. United States, 299 F.2d 117 (D.C. Cir. 1962); De Binder v. 
United States, 292 F.2d 737 (D.C. Cir. 1961); United States v. Hernandez, 282 F.2d 
71 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Alper, 156 F.2d 222 (2d Cir. 1946). 
102. Cf. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th 
Cir. 1963); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963); 
Nairn v. Clary, 312 F.2d 748 (3d Cir. 1963). See also Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United 
Shoe Mach. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1958); United States v. Ben Grunstein 
&: Sons Co., 137 F. Supp. 197 (D.N.J. 1955). 
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Corp.,103 a criminal antitrust trial, the Government was ordered to 
produce one day in advance the grand jury testimony of each prose-
cution witness for the court's in camera inspection. When inconsis-
tencies existed, disclosure was allowed. Of assistance to the Second 
Circuit in discovering discrepancies in the grand jury testimony is 
its requirement that the Government be prepared to advise the trial 
judge regarding possible inconsistencies.104 Finally, the fear of trial 
delays and abuse by defendants has not materialized, and the ad-
ministration of criminal law in the Second Circuit has not been 
unduly obstructed.10G 
A third, more restrictive, view permits disclosure of grand jury 
minutes only if some showing of inconsistency has first been made.108 
Such a showing may be satisfied by establishing that the witness 
made extrajudicial statements that are inconsistent with his trial 
testimony or that other evidence demonstrates certain discrepancies 
in his testimony.107 The principal advantage of this rule is that it 
eliminates all "fishing expeditions" and requires the defendant to 
make some showing that his request is made in good faith. This rule 
also eliminates the objection of repeated trial delays advanced against 
the Second Circuit rule. It is clear, however, that a showing of 
inconsistency between grand jury and trial testimony should not 
be required. Instead, any evidence that casts some doubt on the 
credibility of a prosecution witness or raises the "possibility" of 
inconsistency in his testimony should be sufficient to require the 
court to exercise its discretion and allow disclosure or, at least, to 
make an in camera inspection. A more limited rule would place on 
a defendant an insuperable burden-a burden that the Supreme 
Court has specifically found to be unreasonable.108 But, even if 
103. 1963 Trade Cas. 1[ 70967 (E.D. Pa. 1963). 
104. Cf. United States v. McKeever, 271 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1959); United States v. 
Spangelet, 258 F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1958). See also United States v. Zborowski, 271 
F.2d 661, 667-68 (2d Cir. 1959). Indeed, in United States v. Grunewald, 162 F. Supp. 
621 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), the Government voluntarily gave the defense access to the grand 
jury testimony of Government witnesses. 
105. New York state has adopted the same rule as the Second Circuit. See People 
v. Dales, 309 N.Y. 97, 127 N.E.2d 829 (1955); People v. Boniello, 303 N.Y. 619, 101 
N.E.2d 488 (1951); People v. Schainuck, 286 N.Y. 161, 165-66, 36 N.E. 2d 94, 96 (1941). 
The rule of New York has been adopted by New Mexico. See State v. Morgan, 67 
N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960). 
106. See People v. Harden, No. 1301, Cook County Ill. Crim. Ct., Dec. 13, 1963. 
107. Harrell v. United States, 317 F.2d 580 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Minton v. State, 113 
So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1959); People v. Harden, supra note 106. 
108. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 401, 408 (1959). 
Secondary sources have uniformly denounced the requirement of establishing incon-
sistencies between the trial and grand jury testimony of a witness. See, e.g., Note, 11 
SYRACUSE L. REv. 225 (1960). 
January 1965] Grand Jury Secrecy 481 
inconsistency between grand jury testimony and trial testimony 
need not be shown, many indigent prisoners, unable to afford an 
investigation for outside evidence, will be effectively barred under 
this third view unless their court-appointed counsel are able to es-
tablish the requisite discrepancies through cross-examination. It is 
for this reason that several courts have held that, if the state's case 
is based upon the testimony of one or two witnesses whose credibility 
is of utmost importance, a right sense of justice requires disclosure 
of the grand jury minutes of their testimony to assure rigorous cross-
examination and as thorough an impeachment as the evidence 
permits.100 
The rule of grand jury secrecy is presently proceeding through 
the same evolutionary path as the Jencks rule.110 Although the 
Supreme Court has held that the Jencks rule does not apply to grand 
jury minutes,111 the rationale and reasons for that rule certainly are 
apposite as a rule of faimess.112 So overwhelming is the need to pro-
tect the rights of a defendant that the Supreme Court and Congress 
under the Jencks rule have required disclosure of all statements 
given to police by a prosecution witness in order to enable the de-
fense to examine them thoroughly for possible impeaching evidence. 
The only determination to be made by the trial judge is whether 
the scope of the statements are within the subject matter of the 
witness' trial testimony. Significantly, the interests of the Govern-
ment in the confidentiality of those reports, often FBI informant 
reports which could affect the national security, were not considered 
so overwhelming as to outweigh the personal interests of the 
defendant in obtaining disclosure. 
The maintenance of secrecy over the use of grand jury minutes 
can hardly be said to be of greater importance than preserving the 
secrecy of confidential FBI reports. Yet, as to the latter, the veil of 
secrecy has been permanently removed. It is fair to conclude, therefore, 
109. State v. Moffa, 64 N.J. Super. 69, 165 A.2d 219 (1960). See also State v. Morgan, 
67 N.M. 287, 354 P.2d 1002 (1960). Such a requirement is absolutely essential in cases 
of rape and other crimes where the thread between truth and perjury hangs thin. 
Gordon v. Commonwealth, 92 Pa. 216 (1879); People v. Harden, No. 1301, Cook 
County Ill. Crim. Ct., Dec. 13, 1963. 
ll0. Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). See note 92 supra. 
lll. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 398 (1959). Contra, 
United States v. Rosenberg, 245 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1957), which held the Jencks rule 
controlling as to grand jury testimony. 
ll2. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 159 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 
1958). See People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 173 N.E.2d 881 (1961). See also Comment, 
27 FORDHAM L. REV. 244 (1958); Comment, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 482 (1960); Note, 73 HARV. 
L. REv. 185 (1959). 
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that the courts, and perhaps Congress also, will soon recognize the 
same need for disclosure of grand jury minutes, especially in view 
of the fact that the reasons for their secrecy have spent themselves 
when the grand jury has been discharged, the defendant has been 
apprehended, and the witness has testified. 
B. After the Government Has First Used the Grand Jury Minutes 
Another area that deserves comment relates to the right of a 
defendant to examine the grand jury minutes of a witness after they 
have first been used by the prosecution either to impeach the wit-
ness or to refresh his recollection. The Supreme Court in United States 
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.113 held that it is not an abuse of dis-
cretion for a trial judge to refuse disclosure of grand jury minutes 
when they have first been used to refresh the recollection of Govern-
ment witnesses. The Court noted, however, that the prior grand 
jury testimony was either cumulative or dealt only with the minu-
tiae of the conspiracy. The record, even without the testimony of 
the witnesses so refreshed, clearly established all the necessary facts 
for proof of the illegal conspiracy. "Hence, the situation is vastly 
different from those cases where essential ingredients of the crime 
were dependent on testimony elicited in that manner or where the 
evidence of guilt hung in delicate balance if that testimony was 
deleted."114 Although the majority in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. 
United States did not discuss the question, four Justices stated in 
dissent: "Of course, when the Government uses grand jury minutes 
at trial the defense is ordinarily entitled to inspect the relevant testi-
mony . . . ."115 From these Supreme Court pronouncements it is 
clear that, at least when the testimony refreshed is of importance 
to the Government in establishing guilt, the defendant is entitled 
to examine the grand jury testimony covering that subject matter. 
Whether this privilege should be restricted to essential testimony 
is not clear; the existence of such a rule raises some important ques-
tions of fairness. 
To adopt a procedure that permits the prosecution alone to have 
unlimited use of grand jury minutes for purposes of impeaching or 
refreshing the recollection of state witnesses is to abide- by a rule 
that will lead to grave abuse. In this situation, no reason can be 
113. 310 U.S. 150, 231-37 (1940). 
II4. Id. at 235. Furthermore, the witnesses so refreshed were either employed 
by one of the defendants or closely associated with them and were hostile, evasive, 
and reluctant to testify. Id. at 231. 
II5. 360 U.S. 395, 404 (1959). 
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advanced for maintaining continued secrecy, since the prosecution 
itself is initiating partial disclosure presumably to adduce testimony 
that is most damaging to the defendant. Such disclosure should 
constitute a waiver by the prosecution of any right to continued 
secrecy, for what can be left to protect except evidence that will 
contradict or place in proper perspective the damaging evidence 
already elicited. Judge Learned Hand, long an advocate of grand 
jury secrecy, stated in United Sates v. Cotter: 
"It is indeed true that the prosecution having used the 
former testimony, the defendants were entitled to put in such 
other parts as threw light upon it .... Nor is this right se-
cured by the judge's going over the record for himself and 
selecting so much as he thinks relevant. The party must be 
allowed an inspection for himself; not of the whole minutes of 
course, but the whole evidence of the witness. This does not 
invade the secrecy of the grand jury; it is not an inspection of 
the minutes preparatory to trial and in invitum, which is in no 
circumstances permissible. . . . But when the prosecution 
chooses to open them, the time for secrecy has passed, fair deal-
ing requires that the other side shall inspect them freely."116 
Using this reasoning, numerous federal and state courts have held 
that once the prosecution has used the grand jury minutes for the 
purposes of refreshing the recollection of a witness the defense has 
a right to examine them.117 Likewise, they have held that, when 
the minutes are used to impeach a defense witness, disclosure as a 
matter of right must be made to the defendant.118 And, even when 
the state has refreshed the witness' recollection outside of the court-
room, a right sense of fairness requires that the defendant have an 
equal opportunity to discern any discrepancies that might exist in 
that prior testimony.119 To perpetuate the rule of secrecy in such an 
116. 60 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932). Compare 
United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923). 
117. See e.g., United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 
1961); Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 146-47 (6th Cir. 1960); 
United States v. H.J.K. Theatre Corp., 236 F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1956); United States 
v. Weinberg, 226 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1955); People v. Stevenson, 103 Cal. App. 82, 284 
Pac. 487 (1930); People v. Kraus, 377 Ill. 539, 37 N.E.2d 182 (1941); State v. Archibald, 
204 Iowa 406, 215 N.W. 258 (1927); Turk v. Martin, 232 Ky. 479, 23 S.W .2d 937 (1930); 
State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957). But see 'Lennon v. United States, 
20 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1927); State v. Rhoads, 81 Ohio St. 397, 91 N.E. 186 (1910); State 
v. Magers, 36 Ore. 38, 58 Pac. 892 (1899); State v. Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 
(1935). 
118. See United States v. Stone, 282 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1960); People v. Miller, 257 
N.Y. 54, 177 N.E. 306 (1931). See also Squaire v. State, 64 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 1953); People 
v. O'Neill, 107 Mich. 556, 65 N.W. 540 (1895). 
119. State v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 136 A.2d 761 (1957). 
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instance is to make the rule _an end in itself, unsupported by reason, 
logic, or necessity. Secrecy then could become only an instrument 
of the prosecution, to be used or abused as it sees fit, rather than a 
policy for the protection of the grand jury. 
C. The Witness Seeks Disclosure 
Frequently a witness or the defendant may seek disclosure of his 
own grand jury testimony for purposes of refreshing his recollec-
tion. This is becoming increasingly true in antitrust criminal cases, 
where witnesses are employees or officers of the defendant corpora-
tion. Because of the frequent and prolonged delays between the 
grand jury hearing and the trial, such refreshment of recollection 
is often a grave necessity if the witness is to avoid entrapment due 
to inconsistencies, an inevitable result of the passage of time. With-
out such refreshment, a witness is often at the complete mercy of 
the prosecution, which can impeach his testimony directly or in-
directly on matters most damaging to the defense while leaving 
sealed that testimony which, if brought to the attention of the wit-
ness, might clarify or nullify the adverse evidence elicited. 
Reasons for nondisclosure were discussed in the majority opinion 
of Pittsburgh Plate Glass: 
"[B]ut testimony would be parsimonious if each witness knew 
that his testimony would soon be in the hands of the accused. 
Especially is this true in antitrust proceedings where fear of 
business reprisal might haunt both the grand juror and the 
witness."120 
These reasons are wholly inapplicable, however, when the witness 
voluntarily invites disclosure in order to fully refresh his own rec-
ollection. In United States v. Standard Oil, disclosure was per-
mitted when a witness consented to it.121 In an analogous situation, 
the court in United States v. Schoeneman122 said: "The government 
could be prejudiced by a disclosure of other witnesses, but the court 
is unable to discern how the government could be adversely affected 
by a disclosure to defendant of his own testimony." To deny dis-
closure in such a case would not only be a great unfairness to the 
defense and to employee witnesses, but it would subvert the rule 
of secrecy beyond all reason and simply make it an outright instru-
120. 360 U.S. at 400. 
121. No. 11584-C (S.D. Cal. 1955) (Pretrial Memorandum No. 1). 
122. 203 F. Supp. 840, 842 (D.D.C. 1962). See also the perjury cases dealing with 
the same question, supra note 52. 
. 
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ment of the prosecution.123 "The blanket of secrecy is not so im-
prisoning as to defeat justice."124 
V. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 112-6 OF THE 
ILLINOIS CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Unquestionably, with each new decision on the subject of grand 
jury secrecy the pattern of a more liberalized use of grand jury 
minutes by defendants has become more securely implanted. State 
and federal appellate courts have recognized the need for dis-
closure at both the pretrial and trial stage; state legislatures in in-
creasing numbers have focused on the problems herein raised and 
have passed important legislation liberalizing discovery. But ob-
structing the path of this judicial trend toward more liberal dis-
covery and use of grand jury minutes stands section 112-6 of the 
new Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure; it provides: 
"(b) Matters other than the deliberations and vote of any 
grand juror may be disclosed by the State's Attorney solely in 
the performance of his duties. When the State uses, for the 
purpose of examining any witness, any part of a transcript of 
matters occurring before the Grand Jury, that portion of the 
transcript may be disclosed when the court, preliminary to or 
in connection with a judicial proceeding, directs such in the 
interest of justice. . . . Any grand juror or officer of the court 
who shall disclose, other than to his attorney, matters occurring 
before the Grand Jury other than in accordance with the pro-
visions of this subsection shall be in contempt of court, subject 
to proceedings in accordance to law."125 
A careful examination of this statute forcefully demonstrates 
that it is not only out of step with even the most conservative judicial 
thinking on the subject but that it is a complete repudiation of over 
a century of case law. The statute effectively withdraws from the 
courts all discretionary power to permit disclosure even though the 
interests of justice might require disclosure. It can be categorically 
stated that no other jurisdiction in this country has ever before ta"k.en 
this well-established inherent power to control judicial proceedings 
from its courts. Prior to passage of section 112-6, Illinois decisions 
123. There can be no valid distinction between an individual defendant seeking 
his own testimony and a corporate defendant seeking the testimony of its own em-
ployees or officers when those witnesses have freely consented to such disclosure. 
124. United States v. Byoir, 58 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Tex. 1945). 
125. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-6 (1963). 
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had long recognized and applied this inherent power in permitting 
disclosure of grand jury testimony.126 
The statute places complete control of grand jury minutes in the 
hands of the prosecution. Only if the state decides to use the grand 
jury minutes does the court have any discretion to permit disclosure 
to a defendant. In addition to violating a sense of fairness, this pro-
cedure places in the hands of the state an instrument fraught with 
potential abuses. As already noted, the prosecution could prevent 
the disclosure of grand jury testimony regardless of how convinced 
the court might be that such testimony would establish a ground for 
perjury or impeachment of a witness. Significantly, under prior 
Illinois case law, if the prosecution used the grand jury testimony 
of a witness at the trial, the defendant was entitled to examine it as 
a matter of right. Under the new statutory provision, disclosure is 
left to the discretion of the court.127 Contrary to prior Illinois 
practice, under the new provision a grand juror may not testify as 
to testimony given before the grand jury, even when the "ends of 
justice require it," if such testimony has not been used by the 
state.128 This changes a procedure recognized in Illinois as long 
ago as 1846.129 
This statute, therefore, is not only a complete departure from all 
common-law concepts of grand jury secrecy, both within Illinois and 
elsewhere, but it also infringes upon the very philosophy underlying 
a court's inherent power to exercise discretionary control of the dis-
126. As early as 1846, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Granger v. Warrington, 8 Ill. 
299 (1846), recognized this discretionary power of a trial judge to permit disclosure 
of grand jury testimony. In Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 8 N.E. 62 (1886), the 
Illinois Supreme Court stated: 
"There can be no reason, then, why evidence given before a grand jury should 
not be made known, and proved, if the ends of justice require it, A contrary 
course would tend to defeat, instead of to promote, justice, and be directly in 
opposition to the tendency of the age, which is to enlarge, rather than to con• 
tract, the sources of evidence," 
Id. at 437, 8 N.E. at 67. 
This power was repeatedly recognized by the Illinois Supreme Court, lower Illinois 
appellate courts, and Illinois trial courts until at least eighteen days before the new 
Illinois Code went into effect on Jan. 1, 1964, when Judge Brussell of the Criminal 
Court of Cook County granted disclosure in People v. Harden, No. 1301, Cook 
County Ill. Crim. Ct., Dec. 13, 1963. E.g., People v. Kraus, 377 Ill. 539, 37 N.E.2d 
182 (1941); People v. Goldberg, 302 Ill. 559, 135 N.E. 84 (1922); Hoge v. People, 117 
Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796 (1886); Looney v. People, 81 Ill. App. 370 (1898); Louis v. People, 
81 Ill. App. 358 (1898). 
127, See People v. Kraus, supra note 126; People v. Harden, No. 1301, Cook County 
Crim. Ct., Dec. 13, 1963. 
128. E.g., Bressler v. People, 117 Ill. 422, 8 N.E. 62 (1886); Hoge v. People, 117 
Ill. 35, 6 N.E. 796 (1886); Granger v. Warrington, 8 Ill. 299 (1846). 
129. See Granger v. Warrington, supra note 128. 
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closure of grand jury proceedings. The reasons for this retrogressive 
departure from the general trend of the law are not clear; nor can 
the impact of this legislation on other jurisdictions be easily meas-
ured. It is of significance that the drafting committee that prepared a 
"Tentative Final Draft of the Proposed Illinois Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1963" recommended, without dissent, a provision con-
cerning grand jury secrecy substantially similar to rule 6(e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That draft provided: 
"(b) Matters other than the deliberations and vote of any grand 
juror may be disclosed by the State's Attorney solely in the 
performance of his duties. Matters occurring before the Grand 
Jury may be disclosed when the court, preliminary to or in 
connection with a judicial proceeding, directs such in the in-
terests of justice . ... Any person who shall disclose, other than 
to his attorney, matters occurring before the Grand Jury other 
than in accordance with the provisions of this subsection shall be 
in contempt of court, subject to the proceedings in accordance 
to law."180 
This draft quite clearly would have codified the common-law 
discretionary power of the courts to permit disclosure of grand jury 
minutes. However, both the Illinois House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees amended this provision to eliminate the discretionary 
judicial power. With little or no debate, the respective committees 
approved the amendments, and the provision that became section 
112-6 was enacted into law by the Illinois Legislature. 
In addition to the policy considerations, a statute of this type 
raises basic constitutional questions, both at the state and federal 
levels, that militate seriously against judicial approbation. Under the 
state constitution this limitation on disclosure of grand jury testi-
mony seems to violate Illinois' quite typical provision vesting all 
judicial power in the courts.131 
Under the United States Constitution this measure seems to 
130. Tentative Final Draft of the Proposed Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure 
1963, Art. 48-6 (1962). (Emphasis added.) 
131. Section 112-6 is subject to a strong constitutional objection under article 
VI, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 (as amended by a general election 
Nov. 6, 1962), which provides: "The judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court, 
an Appellate Court and Circuit Courts." The Illinois Supreme Court has con-
sistently recognized that the constitutional grant of judicial power "is an exclusive 
and exhaustive grant vesting all such power in the courts." Agran v. Checker Taxi 
Co., 412 Ill. 145, 149, 105 N.E.2d 713, 715 (1952). See also People ex rel. Navert v. 
Smith, 327 Ill. 11, 158 N.E. 418 (1937); People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. 
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931); People v. Bruner, 
343 Ill. 146, 175 N.E. 400 (1931). If the power is judicial in nature, "it necessarily 
follows that the legislature is expressly prohibited from exercising it," or from in 
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violate the due process clause. It is clear that section 112-6 does not 
permit disclosure of grand jury minutes unless and until the prose-
cution uses them. Yet, the due process clause clearly requires that the 
prosecution, upon request, must tum over favorable evidence to a 
defendant at the beginning of the trial. This includes statements of 
witnesses and co-defendants. In Brady v. Maryland132 the Supreme 
Court stated: 
"We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of 
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due • 
process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to 
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution. "133 
In harmony with the Brady decision the Illinois Supreme Court 
stated in People v. Cole:134 
any way attempting to limit or control it. People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill.2d 
288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957); Agran v. Checker Taxi Co., supra. 
Although article VI, section 1 does not define "judicial power," it has been defined 
by the Illinois Supreme Court as the power that adjudicates upon and protects the 
rights and interests of individual citizens. People v. Bruner, supra. And, among the 
basic judicial powers of a trial judge are the discretionary powers to control the pro• 
ceedings before him, to ensure that a defendant is being fairly treated, and to act 
where the interests of justice dictate action. See People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 
supra. 
Moreover, it has long been recognized in the common law that the grand jury is 
an arm of the judiciary and the grand jurors are officers cf the court rather than 
a part of the executive or legislative branches of government. See Brown v. United 
States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); United 
States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 279 (N.D. Cal. 1952). The United States Supreme Court, 
in Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960), stated: "The grand jury is an 
arm of the court and its in camera proceedings constitute 'a judicial inquiry.' " And 
the Illinois supreme court indicated its concurrence with this position in People v. 
Polk, 21 Ill.2d 594, 174 N.E.2d 393 (1961). 
It is thus a judicial function of the court to impanel the grand jury and to 
decide whether to make public the jury's records, which are, in effect, the court's 
records. The legislature can neither curtail nor abrogate this judicial power so long 
as the grand jury system is employed in the state. People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 
supra. Article VI, section 8 of the Illinois Constitution of 1870 does, however, provide 
that the grand jury system may be abolished by law. 
Furthermore, the legislature does not have the power to transfer this function 
of the courts to the state attorney's office. Grand jury proceedings are judicial in 
nature and are subject to direction by the courts, not the state attorney's office 
or the Department of Justice. Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 
194 F. Supp. 763 (D. Mass. 1958). Thus, it manifestly appears that § 112-6 of 
the Illinois Criminal Code is an unconstitutional usurpation of the judicial power. 
132. 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See also Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Pyle v. Kansas, 
317 U.S. 213 (1942); Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 
U.S. 103 (1935). 
133. Id. at 87. In the Brady case, the evidence in question was the statement of an 
accomplice who admitted in an unsigned confession that he had committed the 
actual homicide. See also United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 1, 35, 191 (No. 14692) 
(C.C. Ky. 1806); People v. Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573-74, 18 N.W. 362, 363-64 (1884). 
134. People v. Cole, 30 Ill. 2d 375 (1964). 
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"Where it appears that there is evidence in the possession and 
control of the prosecution favorable to the defendant, a right 
sense of justice demands that it should be made avaL1.;.ble unless 
there are strong reasons othenvise."135 
In the Brady case the state was ordered to make available to the 
defense, prior to trial, statements of an accomplice that were favor-
able to the defendant; and, in the Cole case, the state was ordered to 
make available statements made to the police by the principal pros-
ecution witness that were favorable to the defendant and that had 
been suppressed by the state. 
These cases clearly recognize a basic constitutional right of a 
defendant to have access to favorable evidence that is in the hands 
of the state. The Constitution does not discriminate between evidence 
obtained by the state from an extrajudicial statement of a witness 
and testimony given by that same witness before a grand jury.136 
The life or liberty of an accused is no less important when the source 
of the favorable evidence is the grand jury hearing. Therefore, a 
statute that would stand as an obstruction to such disclosure, as is 
the case with section 112-6, must fall before the constitutional re-
quirements of due process. 
It must be recognized that the state, through the grand jury 
process, is able to sift the incriminating evidence from that favor-
able to a defendant and to bring into focus at the trial only the 
former. Evidence favorable to the defense is often entirely lost 
because the defendant does not have the investigatory resources to 
search out such evidence. It is no answer that the Brady rule places 
an untenable burden on the state to do the defendant's investigat-
ing, for the sole function of the prosecution is to ensure that justice 
is done, not simply to win a tainted conviction.137 
135. Ibid. See also People v. Moses, 11 Ill. 2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1958); People v. 
Davis, 52 Mich. 569, 573-74, 18 N.W. 362, 363-64 (1884). 
136. Looney v. People, 81 Ill. App. 370 (1898). 
137. The Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963), stated: 
"Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials 
are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any accused is 
treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of Justice states 
the proposition candidly for the federal domain: 'The United States wins its 
point whenever justice is done to its citizens in the courts.' A prosecution that 
withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would 
tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily 
on the defendant. That casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a 
proceeding that does not comport with the standards of justice, even though as 
in the present-case, his action is not the 'result of guile' •.. .'' 
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CONCLUSION 
Unquestio,nably, the law purports less to be justice than to be a 
pursuit of it, and each liberalization of criminal discovery is another 
step toward the goal of ultimate criminal justice. The shedding of 
outworn and antiquated concepts of criminal law often takes decades 
to complete; yet, once in motion, the change can be swift and com-
plete. The discarding of outmoded concepts of grand jury secrecy 
has found new and increased momentum in the past decade. For the 
first time, many courts are recognizing the need for pretrial dis-
covery of grand jury minutes and the necessity for allowing their 
introduction at the trial for purposes of impeachment and refreshing 
recollection. The increased use of such testimony has been aug-
mented by concern for the plight of the indigent defendant, who is 
wholly depe1_1dent upon the ability or inability of the criminal 
judicial process of the courts to protect his life and liberty. 
Limitations on disclosure of grand jury minutes such as those 
contained in the new Illinois Criminal Code constitute an obstruc- . 
tion to the progress already made in other jurisdictions. Hopefully, 
such steps backward will be temporary in nature; for legislation of 
that type is completely out of step with the trend of modern judicial 
thinking and, therefore, should not be considered as a model for 
future legislative thought. 
